In an attempt to answer a recent call from the academic community and policy makers on the controversial role of academic spinoffs to economic development, this paper provides evidence on the contribution of firm and university level factors to the growth of UK academic spinoffs.
Introduction
Scholars interested in academic entrepreneurship have studied the topic from two different perspectives. On the one side, the existing literature has studied the process of growth of academic spinoffs by focusing on firm/founder level determinants, mainly overlooking university-level factors which are likely to play an important role (Walter et al., 2006) . This is particularly unfortunate because, similarly to the case of corporate entrepreneurship (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) , decisions and strategies taken at the higher organizational level (e.g. university management) are likely to influence the extent to which spinoffs are able to generate and capture value. On the other side, when organisational level variables have been incorporated into the analysis, the focus has shifted away from the growth process, but rather analysed the determinants of the mere number of academic spinoffs generated by universities (e.g. Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Powers and McDougall, 2005) . This poses a problem as, despite the effort by universities to create a large number of academic spin-offs in the past two decades, these are often companies with below-average size, slow growth and modest profit, thus casting doubts on their contribution to economic development. This is evident in the UK case where, both academics and policy makers have recently criticized the overemphasis on the creation of ASOs and have suggested that more benefits are to be derived by focusing on the creation of fewer firms, but with higher impact (Harrison and Leitch, 2010; Lambert, 2003) . Similarly, results from the Higher Education Business Community Interaction Surveys have highlighted the need to go for new venture creation only in cases of remarkable growth potential (HEFCE, 2014) . Similar evidence has emerged from studies focusing on other countries: Canada (Bathelt et al., 2011) , Norway (Borlaug et al., 2009) and Italy (Iacobucci and Micozzi, 2015) .
The commercial exploitation of research results developed within academia via venture creation is a challenging process. Recent theoretical approaches to the processes of academic engagement with industry highlight the existence of different institutional frameworks on which the academic scientific community, on the one hand, and the industry, on the other hand, rely upon (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013; Perkmann et al., 2011) . The science logic is the dominant one within universities, and the norms and incentives that rule the academic environment are largely based on publication priority, scientific impact and disciplinary-based recognition (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Merton, 1979) . Conversely when dealing with the creation of ASOs, universities need to confront a market logic, which is driven by reach-to-market priority, knowledge appropriability and maximization of value capture (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2005; Jensen, 2010) .
The exploitation of results from academic research via venture creation fits well in the multiple logics framework, as science and market logics lie at opposite extremes (Meyer et al., 1980) . Notably, universities need to cope with different norms and incentives when commercialisation of research results is undertaken through the creation of academic spin-offs, which is the pivotal expression of the practical realisation of market logic within academia. When dealing with the process of ASO creation, universities constitute therefore an example of hybrid organisation, which is an organisation subject to multiple institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) .
Institutional logics perspective emerged as an extension of institutional theory with the purpose of shedding light on the complexity of the social systems in which individual and organisations operate (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) . The recognition of simultaneous presences of different institutional logics within the same organisational field -i.e. "a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system" (Scott, 2001, p. 207 ) -and the foundation of the institutional logics perspective, are to be attributed to the seminal contribution of Friedland and Alford (1991) .
The presence of multiple logics within a field is the norm rather than the exception (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Scott, 2001) , and theoretical explanations about how organisational behaviours are shaped by conflicts among logics are now considerable. It is in fact acknowledged that different logics have different weights within organisations (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012) , are frequently in conflicts as they rely on different and often incoherent institutions (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) , however can coexist for long period of time within an organisation not necessarily resolving the tensions between them (Dunn and Jones, 2010) . Most of this theorising adopts an organisational field level of analysis, and focus on how multiple logics combination drive the behaviours of fields (e.g. Dunn and Jones, 2010; Lee and Lounsbury, 2015; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Townley, 2002) . The theoretical and empirical knowledge on institutional logics' combination mostly provides an explanation for the behaviour of an organisation at the aggregate level, i.e. on average within a field. Much less is known about how organisations within a field respond differently to confronting logics.
However organisations can display variation in being subject to a combination of logics (Greenwood et al., 2011 , Lounsbury, 2007 . Lounsbury (2007) shows that different locations with different historical contingencies gave rise to a variation in how the field of mutual funds behave in these two locations. Similarly Greenwood et al. (2010) , starting from the recognition that non-market logics such as religion and family have different weights across Spanish regions, show that firms behave differently across regions because they are subject to different logics combination patterns. Although these studies highlight the presence of organisational heterogeneity, they only take into account the variety deriving from supra-organisational factors, such as community factors (Lee and Lounsbury, 2015) . Comparatively less studied is how the same combination of logics may be differently handled within a field due to organisational-level specificities.
Building on the consideration that organisations within an organisational field are heterogeneous in their characteristics, Greenwood et al. (2014) argue that institutional logics theorising does not yet account for the variety of patterns by which institutional logics operate in conjunction with organisational specificities (see also Greenwood et al., 2011) . More specifically, "it is the interaction between the institutional environment and traditional contingency variables that requires exploration because of their independent and joint effect on organisational form and vice versa. Put another way, even when faced with the same institutional pressures, there will be organisational heterogeneity because of the play of contingency factors" (Greenwood et al., 2014 (Greenwood et al., , p. 1216 . Kraatz and Block (2008) argue that "organizational governance can be usefully thought of as the process through which an 'organizational self' selects, prioritizes and/or integrates its various institutionally-given identities (and also as the process through which these identities conjointly construct an organizational self)." In other words it is to be expected that organisational structure and characteristics influence how logics heterogeneously operate within a field (Greenwood et al., 2011) .
Our work investigates the variation that organisations show, within the same organisational field, in dealing with the combination of two institutional logics, particularly when a minority logic is integrated into a dominant logic (Durand and Jourdan, 2012) . We do so throughout an empirical analysis of the process of academic spin-off creation from UK universities.
Our main interest is to explore how organisational factors relate to the integration of multiple logics. We do so by building upon a number of works which call for institutional theory to draw more heavily from considerations of strategy (Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011; Durand, 2012; Oliver, 1997 Oliver, , 1991 . This means to account for "variations in how organizations conform" toward an output (Duran, 2012, p. 299 ; see also Durand and Jordan, 2012) . We contend that a more efficient integration of market and science logics contributes to the creation of successful ASOs.
We then empirically show that strategic agency and resources (Beckert, 1999; Durand and Jourdan, 2012; Heugens and Lander, 2009; Oliver, 1997 Oliver, , 1991 at the university level are associated to higher levels of integration of market and science logics, i.e. to the generation of higher growing academic spin-offs.
In so doing this work first contributes to the institutional logics theory by enriching our comprehension on the complexity of the relation between logics integration and organisational specificities within a field. Also, our work contributes to the academic entrepreneurship literature and policy debate by being, to our knowledge, the first paper seeking to identify those factors that help universities to deliver economic and social impact for society as a whole through new venture creation. Section 2 reviews the foundations of institutional logics theory and develops the connected research hypotheses. Section 3 reports the data collection and methodology. Results of the empirical analysis are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Theory and hypotheses
Works grounding on the institutional logics perspective only recently started to investigate the dynamics of logics coexistence (e.g. (Dunn and Jones, 2010) , rather than exploring changes in prevalence of the dominant institutional logic within a certain organisational field (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Townley, 1997) . A recent stream of this literature investigates the multiplicity of institutional logics and mostly focuses on how different logics are combined. These studies mainly describe how relationship between logics emerged and changed through time (Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Purdy and Gray, 2009) , mostly due to their conflicting and competing nature (e.g. Thorton and Ocasio, 1999) . Although a large part of institutional logics analysis and principles are developed at the organisational field level, various scholars highlighted that institutional logics pressures impact on organisational practices and behaviours in different ways (e.g. McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007) . Pache and Santos (2013) for example show that within the same organisational field one can find organisations of rather different nature and that organisations behave differently in order to gain legitimacy toward the external environment. Greenwood et al. (2010) show that non-market logics such as the family and the state moderate the adherence of business firms to the market logics: contextual level factors shape organisations' behaviours toward logics integration.
It therefore emerges that institutional logics pressure is embraced by organisations according to a variety of formal structures (Joseph et al., 2014) . The integration of multiple institutional logics is likely to vary in respect to how organisations are structured and managed (Greenwood et al., 2010; . In other words, the output of multiple logics integration is a function of organisational governance and business models (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2014; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016) . Strategic choices therefore influence the degree of logics combination (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016) , or, differently put, the degree of conformity towards one logic or another (Durand and Jourdan, 2012) .
According to Durand (2012, p. 299) , institutional logics theory needs to be augmented "with strategic reasoning and decision-making rooted in organizational resources and capacities".
Various studies approached institutional theory through strategic lenses (Oliver, 1991; Durand et al., 2013; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016) . Adopting a strategy perspective means to take into consideration issues of value profitability and rents (Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011) . Market-logic based organisations aim at maximising profit and performance (Jensen, 2010; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016) . Provided we are seeking to explain the degree to which organisations dominated by science logic conform to market logic, we contend that the market logic is integrated to a higher extent within the dominant science logic when the market logics manifest to a higher extent, that is to say when ASOs perform better. We therefore assume that higher degrees of university conformity to the minority market logic are identified in the higher performance of the ASOs created by that university.
Following the research integrating strategy and institutional logics, we investigate organisational strategic response to institutional pressure grounding on two further stream of research. The first combines institutional logics theory with resources perspective (Oliver, 1991; Durand and Jordan, 2012) . The second expands institutional theory through agency-related considerations (Zajac and Westphal, 1996; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Currie and Spyridonidis, 2015) .
Combination and integration of logics depend on resources endowments and on the agencyrelated constraints in place at the organisational level. The degree to which an organisation conforms towards a minority logic can be considered a function of its resources availability and agency-structures. By augmenting institutional logics theory with considerations about resources and agency (Oliver, 1991; Beckert, 1999; Heugens and Lander, 2009; Durand and Jordan, 2012) , we develop three hypotheses based on the case of academic spin-off creation.
Institutional logics and resource perspective
Several works highlight how resources are a main driver of institutional logics adoption or conformity (Oliver, 1991; , especially when the logics detain a rather minor role compared to a more dominant one (Durand and Jordan, 2012) . Resource capital serves "as foundations on which an institutional logics is acted out" and represents a main driver of logic existence and persistence (Misangyi et al., 2008, p. 755) . Organisations implement institutional logics through strategic responses regarding how to conform toward that logic (Kraatz and Block, 2008) .
Accordingly "the response of an organisation to competing logics, in other words, is partly a function of how logics are given voice within the organisation; but the ability of a voice to be heard is linked to the influence of that logic's field-level proponents over resources -including legitimacy -that they control" (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 349) . For instance Durand and Jourdan (2012) , with an empirical investigation of the French film industry, show how a minority logic and minority logics holders' are able to survive next to the dominant logics by means of resources acquisitions, although maintaining the minority status within the field.
Resources are to be conceived not only in their monetary form: the role of competences in driving the establishment of an institutional logic are found to play a crucial role for the deployment of that logic (Creed et al., 2002; Kraatz and Moore, 2002) . Integrating institutional theory with the resource based view, Oliver (1991 Oliver ( , 1997 states that resource capital, defined as the "value-enhancing assets and competencies of the firm", can explain sustainable and competitive advantage of firms only if coupled with institutional capital, defined as 'the firms' capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies".
These insights well suit an institutional logics approach to academic entrepreneurship. In the context of academic entrepreneurship, resources are considered to be a main factor explaining the propensity of a university to engage with industry. Powers and McDougall (2005) conceptualise universities as embedded in a competitive market-like environment, and show that market-related resources are a main determinant of their ability to create a higher number of academic spin-offs.
The argument explaining this empirical relationship rests in the market-related knowledge universities are able to acquire through engagement with industry (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Lockett et al., 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005) . More specifically engaging with industry grants, other than funds, the access to industry business needs, network assets, entrepreneurial capabilities, and on the like.
Institutional logics and academic entrepreneurship theories share the view that resources can explain the degree of conformity towards a particular institutional logic and the degree of efficiency towards the academic entrepreneurship output. So, if university-industry literature widely embrace the position that engaging with industry represents a main source of resources useful to pursue academic entrepreneurship (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Powers and McDougall, 2005) , institutional logics theorising reveals that the monetary resources and the competence base of the organisation influences its behaviour in respect to the conformity towards an additional logic (Durand and Jordan, 2012; Durand et al., 2013) . In a similar vein, being positioned in important network of actors is associated to the establishment of some logics rather than others (Misangyi et al., 2008) ; and benefitting from the presence of specific-skilled leaders influenced the logics evolution and change in American arts colleges (Kraatz and Moore, 2002) .
Minority logic will therefore have higher probability to be integrated within a dominant logic if it can rely on greater resources. Consequently we postulate the following hypothesis:
H1: The integration of a minority-market within a dominant-science logic is positively associated to the resources associated to the minority-market logic
Institutional logics and agency theory
The degree of conformity of an organisation towards a minority logic is not only dependent on the resources associated to that logic. The integration also involves agency costs. These costs are of two forms, both of which affect the individuals exploiting an academic research result via new venture creation. The first form of agency costs emerges because of the asymmetries of information between a principle -university managers that seek to promote academic entrepreneurship -and an agent -academic staff who tend to be governed by research-related objectives, therefore by the science logics principles, and less by commercial oriented purposes (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013) . The second form of agency costs rests in the individual uncertainty costs deriving from pursuing some unusual -minority logic-related -actions (academic entrepreneurship) rather than not to (Jensen, 1998; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) . Agency costs are therefore in every human action, as are incentives: "The issue for any organization is not whether to introduce incentives to motivate its employees. There are always incentives; the issue is simply which incentives we want to encourage and which we want to suppress" (Jensen, 1998, p. 40) .
Agency theory plays an important role in institutional theory and is directly connected to the resource perspective on institutional logics. Individuals operate in their perceived interest by strategically making use of available resources (DiMaggio 1988 , Bekert, 1999 . Institutional theory explains a great deal of institutional evolution and change through the use of discretion and self-interest (DiMaggio, 1988) . Individuals are capable of creating and institutionalising new logics by leveraging on their self-interest (Garud et al., 2007) , or are capable of manipulating how a logic is internalised within another logic through their action (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) .
The concept of embedded agency helps in contextualising the actions of individuals as, on the one hand, driven by the institutional structure that they belong to and, on the other hand, moderated by the interest and judgment of the individuals themselves (Garud et al., 2007) . The recent stream of institutional entrepreneurship research is concerned with analysing those individuals who are able to break with the predominant institutional environment to institutionalise new logics (Battilana et al., 2009 ). This happens because individuals follow their interest and exert autonomy. It is then clear how organisational structures have the choice to constrain (or promote) agency-related practices of individuals (Garud et al., 2007) .
The coexistence of competing institutional logics offers an ideal setting to the analysis of strategic agency. McPherson and Sauder (2013) provide evidence that individuals' adhere to one of multiple logics depending on their preference for the specific contextual situation. The authors show that individuals, although operating under some dominant institutional logics, find consistent space to discretionally choose among logics adoption. Currie and Spyridonidis (2016) further expand the individual day to day autonomy and discretion. Based on a comparative study of two hospitals in UK, they conclude that nurse managers exert an important degree of agency, however this is moderated by their social position and the "situational constraints", that means organisational specificities (Currie and Spyridonidis, 2016, p. 2) .
The above studies reveal that organisations have the ability to favour or constrain the behaviours and the strategic choices of their employees. Also, these works highlight that the degree of conformity towards a minority logic can be moderated by organisational strategies (Kraatz and identify the provision of "reward system for faculty involvement" as an important universitylevel factor which influences TTO's productivity. Similarly, Debackere and Veugelers (2005) argue that attractive incentive structures lead to a higher number of industry-science connections.
Secondly, discretion and autonomy left to individuals emerge to increase the pursuing of selfinterest's driven actions. Following Jain and George (2007, p.561) , academic entrepreneurship involves high degrees of experimentation "that require ongoing fine-tuning and renegotiation".
According to Debackere and Veugelers (2005) , the management of industry-science links benefits from an approach that grants "a sufficient level of autonomy for developing relations with industry". In a study on foreign IPOs performance, Bell et al. (2012) provide evidence that the level of independence of the board can alleviate potential agency conflicts between the different institutional logics of the home and host countries, by leading to an increase in the IPO's success in the host country. Similarly, Markman et al. (2005) contend that TTOs with a higher degree of autonomy generate a higher number of new ventures.
We therefore put forth the following two hypotheses:
H2a: The presence of a system of incentives for engagement with industry is positively associated with the integration of market and science logics.
H2b: The presence of boundaries in managing the creation of new ventures at the university level is negatively associated with the integration of market and science logics.
Empirical framework

Data
This work investigates the determinants of the degree of conformity of universities towards the market logic when dealing with ASO creation. The degree of conformity (Durand and Jordan, 2012 ) is captured by the growth of ASOs. We then seek to explain ASOs' growth in terms of both ASOs' level-characteristics and university-level characteristics.
The initial source of data for our study is the list of UK spinoffs provided by Spinouts UK, 1 which contained the name and affiliation of 1175 UK-based companies. The same source of information has been adopted in other studies (e.g. Pitsakis et al., 2015) , and represent the population of ASOs created after year 2000. This information was matched with two different sources of data in order to retrieve data at the firm and university levels. As for the firm level, we combine information on balance sheet (from FAME BvD), venture capital (Zephyr BvD), 
Method
The objective here is to investigate the firm-level and university-level determinants of firms' growth. Because data are nested (i.e., firms are nested within universities that spun them off), we adopt a multilevel linear modelling approach to test our hypotheses (Hofmann, 1997) . Multilevel models are a set of statistical techniques which allow researchers to examine relationships across multiple levels of analysis. There are several advantages to the use of multilevel models which resonates well with our study setting. First, it is explicitly recognized that firms within a particular university may share commonalities and, therefore, may not provide independent observations. Second, these models allow to investigate both lower level unit (i.e. academic spinoff) and higher level unit (i.e. university) variance in the outcome measure (i.e. academic spinoff's growth), while maintaining the appropriate level of analysis for the independent variables. Therefore, we are able to model both firm and university level variance in academic spinoff outcomes while utilizing firm predictors at the firm level and university predictors at the university level. where Z ij indicates a series of firm level controls; H j are a number of university level control variables and  ij is the error term.
Variables
We measure the growth of the academic spinoff using data on total assets retrieved from FAME BvD. Specifically, our dependent variable Growth ij refers to the average growth rate of total assets of firm i, created by university j, over a three year period. 3 We are aware that firm growth can be investigated using a wide variety of measures (Delmar et al., 2003) , however growth in total assets has also the advantage of better capturing information for small firms, that are not obliged to state other suitable information (Helmers and Rogers, 2010) . Building upon recent contributions in the field, we use total assets which have been shown to yield similar results to the more traditional measures of growth, such as employment and sales (Helmers and Rogers, 2 The time subscript is being omitted to simplify notation. 3 As robustness check, we run our estimates using two alternative definitions of our growth variable: (i) the one year log difference of total assets and (ii) a three year log difference of total assets. Our main results are confirmed for the robustness checks above.
2010, 2011). Total assets are considered to be a suitable proxy of firm's size, especially in respect to start-ups (Cassar, 2004) .
As for our key explanatory variables, we are interested in testing the effect of a number of firmlevel and university level characteristics on the growth of academic spinoffs. Table 1 reports the list, the description and the source of our independent variables. As for the explanatory variables at the university level, in order to test the hypotheses developed above, we rely upon data from each wave of the Higher Education Business Community Interaction Survey. Following established academic entrepreneurship literature we proxy resources and competence base with the income a university obtain from academic engagement (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Powers and McDougall, 2005) . We therefore rely on the variable Contract research jt that is the (log transformed) amount of contract research obtained by the university j in year t. For what concerns the hypothesis on the agency structure of the university, we proxy the incentive system on the one hand and the degree of discretion on the other constructing two variables from responses to the following questions contained in the survey: "How would you rate the level of incentives for staff at your HEI to engage with Business and the Community?" and "How would you rate the existence of a strategic plan for business support at your HEI?" The respondents were asked to rank the importance of the items on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from "not important" to "highly important". StratIncentive jt is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if university j rated that the level of incentives are highly important (equal or above 4 in the 5-point Likert scale, where 5 represent the maximum level) in year t, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, StratPlan jt is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if university j rated that the presence of a strategic plan is highly important in year t, and 0 otherwise.
We then capture the relevance of firm-level characteristics by relying on three main measures as identified by the literature on start-up growth: human capital, technological innovation, finance (Powell and Sandholtz, 2012) . First, to capture the importance of scientific capabilities and strategic human capital for the creation and growth of the spinoffs, we retrieve information on the composition of the board of directors for all the companies contained in our sample from the UK firm registry. 4 When an individual reports the name suffix "Dr.", we assume he holds a PhD degree. PhD ijt measures the number of company directors with a PhD degree for firm i of university j at time t. Second, we include a variable for the stock of "inventive knowledge" of the firm. PatStock ijt measures the technological capability of spinoff i for university j at time t. The variable is defined as stock (rather than flow) because we expect a spinoff's rate of investment in technology to be affected by the cumulated stock of knowledge and not only by current or lagged flow (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hall et al., 2005) . In this framework, building on a widespread approach, we compute the stock variable for the period 2004-2011 using the perpetual inventory method and assuming a constant depreciation rate of 0.15 (Blundell et al., 1995; Hall, 1993) . Third, as venture capital has been shown to play a prominent role in the creation and development of newly constituted companies (Colombo and Grilli, 2010) , we capture the extent to which a spinoff is able to attract venture capital and business angels' funds.
This data was retrieved from Zephyr, which represent the most complete source of deal information for European firms (Bollaert and Delanghe, 2015) . VC ijt refers to the amount of venture capital funding (in million euros) secured by firm i for university j at time t.
To account for other firm and university level attributes that might be associated with spinoff's growth, we considered a number of control variables. Our first set of controls refers to university characteristics that can influence the growth process of academic spinoffs. First, we control for the extent of experience of the Technology Transfer Office of the university. Exp TTO jt is the number of years elapsed since the creation of a TTO at university j in year t. Second, we control for the existence of mechanisms specifically supporting academic spin-offs at the university level. Service Support jt takes values from 0 to 7 based on the number of support mechanisms for academic spinoffs offered by the university in the period considered. 5 We also control for the revenues generated by third stream activities of the university. Collab research jt and Consultancy contracts jt measures the (log transformed) value of contract research and consultancy contracts of university j at time t. We also include a variable to capture university size, based on the (log transformed) number of permanent staff employed at university j in year t (Uni Size jt ), and the research quality providing an index of the Research Assessment Framework of 2008 (Rae j ).
Finally, we control for systematic differences of firm level predictors at the university level. To do so, we aggregate the main firm-level explanatory variables (PhDs, VC and PatStock) at the university-level and include them as controls in the estimates.
Our second set of controls refers to a number of standard firm level variables. As it is standard in the growth literature, we control for the initial firm size (Firm size it ). We also include the size of the board of directors in order to account for effects stemming from a higher probability to access a wider social and professional network (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014) . Board Size it measures the number of directors in the board for firm i in year t. Our third control variable is Age it which measures the (log transformed) age of company i at time t. Finally, we include a set of firm-level dummy variables to control for time (one dummy per year for the period 2004-2011), industry (at SIC2007 2 digit level) and geographical effects (at 2 digit NUTS level). Table 2 present the descriptive statistics of our variables, while Table 3 report the correlation matrix. Regression results are reported in Table 4 . Model 1 only takes into account the role played by firm-level variables on growth rate. Regarding our main explanatory variables, we observe that the stock of patents possessed by a company is positively related to its three-year growth rate. This resonates with results obtained by the literature on firm growth which has found evidence for a positive association between innovation and firm growth (Coad and Rao, 2008) . A one unit increase in the stock of patents yields an increase of 5.1% in spinoff's growth. More interestingly, the variable measuring the number of board directors with a PhD degree shows a positive and significant correlation (at the 10% level) with firm growth. ASOs are also hybrid organisation at incorporation (Powell and Sandholtz, 2012) , and the presence of scientific knowledge within the firm is a crucial resource for their early-stages performance (Knockaert et al., 2011) . This effect is also meaningful from an economic perspective. All other things being equal, every additional number of PhDs in the board of directors yields an increase of 4.7% in the three-year growth rate. Specification 2 adds university-level explanatory variables to the model and allow to investigate our hypotheses. Results confirm our research hypotheses. First, the amount of research contracts obtained by the university show a positive and significant correlation with growth. A 1% increase in the amount of research contracts obtained by the university yields a 5% increase of the academic spinoffs' growth rate. This result therefore confirms Hypothesis 1, and provide evidence that acquiring resources and competence base from engagement activities allow universities to resolve the conflicts between a dominant science logics when dealing with marketrelated logics. In other words resources allow the organisation to conform toward a minority logic, or to integrate the minority into the dominant logic to a higher extent.
Results
We then observe a positive and significant effect of strategic incentive (StratIncentive) over the growth of academic spinoffs. This effect is quite important as the presence of incentives for engagement with industry yields a 13.7% increase in the three-year growth rate of the company.
We thus find support for Hypothesis 2a, which referred to the role of incentive systems in the engagement with industry and the association with firm's growth. In line with our Hypothesis 2b, the presence of a strategic plan (StratPlan) for business interaction has a negative and significant association with spinoff growth. The presence of a university-stricht strategic plan for engagement with industry brings a 12.3% decrease in academic spinoff's growth. The results regarding Hypothesis 2 resonates well with the argument put forth in the theoretical section that the organisational strategy can reduce agency costs in relation to the achievement of some outcome. In line with the hypotheses put forward in the theoretical section, the existence of a system of incentives to engage with industry is positively associated with ASOs' growth, while a low level of individual autonomy and discretion (as reflected in the presence of a university-wide strategic plan for engagement with industry) negatively affects academic spinoffs' growth.
Model 3 in Table 4 
Robustness checks
As a first robustness check, we run our estimates using two alternative definitions of our growth variable: (i) the one year log difference of total assets and (ii) a three year log difference of total assets. The results confirms the ones already shown in Table 4 and we do not report them.
Conversely, in order to further check if results presented based on the preferred multilevel approach held, we also run our main specification (specification 2 of Table 4 ) under alternative models. These are reported in Table 5 .
In specification 1 of Table 5 we collapse our firm-level data at the mean of the university to which they belong to. By relying on a panel dataset at the university level with university fixed effect we investigate the role of university variables toward the average growth level of all the ASOs generated by that university. In specification 2 of Table 5 we report the results of pooled OLS; specification 3 provides the result of generalised least square random effect with clustered standard error at the level of university. Specification 4 introduce the most restrictive assumptions by reporting the result of a firm-level fixed effect model, with robust standard errors clustered at the university level. As we can note university-level variables behave as expected in almost all models. Only the fixed effect model reveals non-significant coefficients for the presence of a strategic plan and for the role of resources, although signs direction remain the same. The fixed effect model is however overly restrictive in order to investigate our research questions, as the fixed effect tend to underestimate any firm-group difference across universities.
Conversely the other three models reveal significant coefficients for our main variable of interests corroborating the results discussed in the previous section. 
Conclusions
Following recent theoretical approach to university-industry interaction through the tools of institutional logic theory (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013) , this paper moves a first step in answering a recent call from the academic community and policy makers on the controversial role of academic spinoffs to economic development (HEFCE, 2014; Lambert, 2003) . We find evidence that universities with higher level of key resources, a presence of strong incentives and that leave wide discretion to their staff, are capable of generating higher growing academic spinoffs.
Building upon institutional logic theory we show that universities that are able to acquire marketrelated resources and are able to reduce the staff agency costs involved in undertaking an academic entrepreneurship path, will be able to better integrate the minority market logic within the dominant science logics. In other words these universities will conform to the minority market logic to a higher extent. Moreover, in so doing these universities will also better contribute to the economic system, creating academic spinoffs with higher impact to the economy.
This work contributes to the institutional logics theory by empirically showing that organisational configuration impact on the resolution of conflicts among logics within a field. We support the view that further research is needed in order to comprehend how organisational-level factors shape the combination and integration of multiple logics within organisational field, therefore are source of heterogeneity in logics combination within fields (Greenwood et al., 2014) . In the case at hand, in which we study the integration of market logic within organisations in which a nonmarket logic prevails, we show that organisational strategic approach is an important determinant of the integration output. Our results are in line with a recent direction of research that seek to integrate institutional logics theorising with strategy-related arguments (Durand, 2012) . We provide evidence that agency costs reduction and resources acquisition generate heterogeneity in how organisations respond in order to combine multiple institutional logics pressure.
This work also importantly contributes to academic entrepreneurship research and practice.
Differently from previous work on the creation of new venture from academic research this paper seeks to account for the growth of academic spinoff as nested in their specific academic context.
We therefore solve a main gap in the academic entrepreneurship literature, regarding the need to explore how universities can manage the conflict resolution of science and market logics when dealing with the creation of academic spinoffs. Important policy implications derive from our results, for policy makers and university managers who are willing to improve the effectiveness of strategies oriented to improve the efficiency of university-business interactions. 
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